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"Where doubt enters in,
there enters the judicial function."
-Cardozo'
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has swept from
the law a number of archaic legal doctrines; 2 doctrines touching
the most intimate aspects of the lives of California citizens, but
having little relationship to the realities of life in contemporary
* B.S., 1949, University of California at Berkeley; L.L.B. 1952, Uni-
versity of California, Hastings College of Law; National President Ameri-
can Board of Trial Advocates; member California Bar.
** A.B., 1969, University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1972, Univer-
sity of California, Hastings College of Law; member California Bar.
1. B.N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, at 10 (1928).
2. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973), wherein the Court held unconstitutional the automobile "guest
statute". In People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152 (1972), the Court held capital punishment to be unconstitutional.
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971),
wherein the Court reviewed the doctrine of parental immunity for per-
sonal torts and rejected it as an anachronism.
society. The claim requirement of the California Tort Claims Act"
is today the foremost example of a doctrine which has ceased to
serve a legitimate public purpose. It has become a procedural
barrier to the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights and,
thus, deserves an in-depth review by the courts to determine if
this requirement is clothed with any constitutional infirmities.
The Tort Claims Act of 1963 requires that one must file a written
claim for "money or damages" if the claim arises from an act or
omission of the State or a local public entity. 4 If the damages
result from the conduct of a "local public entity," the written claim
must be filed with its governing board.5 In the event that the
damages are the consequence of a State agency's conduct, the
claim must be filed with the State Board of Control.6 In addition
to complying with the administrative requirement of filing a claim,
one must also scrupulously comply with a special "statute of limi-
tations. ' 7 The special "statute of limitations" requires that a claim
be filed within one hundred days after the accrual of the cause of
action.8 The date of accrual is governed by the statute of limi-
tations which would be applicable if there were no requirement
that a claim be presented.9 There are also provisions for filing
3. Cal. Gov. Code § 900 et seq. (Deering 1973). The Tort Claims Act
was enacted in 1963, after the California Supreme Court overruled sover-
eign immunity in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); also see the companion decision,
Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465,
11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961). For a comprehensive study of government tort
liability in California, see A. Van Alstyne, California Government Tort
Liability (1964, Supp. 1969).
4. Claims must be filed with local public entities in all but a few
circumstances specified by statute. Cal. Gov. Code § 905 (Deering 1973).
In contrast, claims must be filed with the State only in expressly enu-
merated circumstances. Cal. Gov. Code § 905.2 (Deering 1973).
5. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 900.2, 900.4 (Deering 1973).
6. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 900.2, 900.6 (Deering 1973).
7. The written claim must be composed by the claimant, or it may
be a form provided by the public entity in question. A composed claim
must contain certain specified information. Cal. Gov. Code § 910 (Deer-
ing 1973). A claim which is presented on a form provided by a govern-
mental entity is presumed to be in compliance with Government Code
section 910. Cal. Gov. Code § 910.4 (Deering 1973).
8. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2 (Deering 1973). All references to the
claim statute in this article include both the administrative requirement
of filing and the short statute of limitations.
9. In their respective areas, the following statutes of limitation de-
termine the date of accrual:
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340, subd. 3 (Deering 1972); one year statute of
limitations for torts;
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5 (Deering 1972); a statute of limitation
of four years from date of injury or one year from date of discovery,
which ever comes first, in cases of medical negligence;
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a claim not timely presented' 0 and for obtaining judicial relief from
the one hundred day filing requirement."
Although the claim requirement touches many areas of the law,12
the authors shall limit this article to an examination of its consti-
tutional validity as it relates to negligence actions involving govern-
mental entities.
The submission of a claim to a governmental agency is a condi-
tion precedent to instituting suit against that entity or one of its
employees.' 3 It is most difficult to perceive the reason or ration-
ality of a distinction which requires that an injured person's rights
be dependent upon the tortfeasor's employer. To the individual
who has had the normal pattern of his life disrupted and his bodily
function impaired, it is of little consequence that the tortfeasor's
paymaster is a governmental entity.
The courts and the Law Revision Commission which drafted
the claim statute have set forth three rationale which are the ex-
clusive justification of the claim requirement:
[1] The statute would permit meritorious claims to be accepted
without litigation;
[2] The statute would permit early investigation, preparation of
a defense, and correction of the offending condition or prac-
tice; and
[3] The statute would permit the budgeting of potential liabili-
ties and make it possible to obtain reasonably priced insur-
ance.
1 4
As will be demonstrated, these historic rationale which justified
enactment of the claim requirement have ceased to be applicable.
Doubt has entered in, and the authors submit that it is now the
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338 (Deering 1972); a three year statute of limi-
tations for fraud, mistake, wrongs to property and rights therein.
10. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4 (Deering 1973).
11. Cal. Gov. Code § 946.6, subd. (e) (Deering 1973).
12. San Luis Obispo County v. Ranchita Cattle Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 383,
94 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1971), [Inverse Condemnation]; Meyers v. Orange
County, 6 Cal. App. 3d 626, 86 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1970), [Action for wrongful
discharge of county employee]; Ridley v. San Francisco, 272 Cal. App. 2d
290, 77 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969), [False arrest and imprisonment]; Stromberg,
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 270 Cal. App. 2d 759, 76
Cal. Rptr. 183 (1969), [Declaratory relief action], Hooper v. Allen, 266
Cal. App. 2d 797, 72 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1968) [Defamation].
13. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 950.2 (Deering 1973).
14. Cases cited note 35 infra.
judicial function to test the constitutionality of this legislation.1 5
JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Society is ever changing, and, therefore, the rules of law which
once served the demands of previously established norms may fail
to correspond to contemporary standards. In such circumstances,
the validity of the rule is called into question, and it is the judicial
function to restore equilibrium.
At times, it has been suggested that the Legislature is the best
suited branch of government to deal with iniquitous statutes and
that the judiciary should scrupulously and conscientiously restrain
itself from passing judgment on their constitutionality so long as
the right to vote is fully honored and the market place of ideas re-
mains open.1" To the contrary, it is the judicial function to rule
upon the constitutionality of statutes and, thus, to maintain some
semblance of equilibrium between contemporary standards and
the existing rule of law.17 The doctrines of "judicial restraint"
and "separation of powers" have often been treated as a single
concept intended to restrain the powers of the judiciary to pass
upon the constitutionality of legislative enactments. The better
approach is to avoid treating such a concept as a principle of judi-
cial construction, but, instead, to recognize it as political ploy rather
than constitutional interpretive doctrine.' 8
15. Not only is the time appropriate for judicial review, but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court currently has before it the case of Whitfield v. Roth,
31 Cal. App. 3d 153, hearing granted June 13, 1973 (S.F. 23020), which may
be a suitable vehicle for such review. In Whitfield, a minor girl brought
an action for injuries alleged to have resulted from misdiagnosis or fail-
ure to diagnose a cranial tumor. Suit was brought against one of the
county hospitals where she was treated and its employee, a defendant
doctor. The trial court entered a judgment of non-suit on the grounds
that: (1) the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when her mother was in-
formed of the cranial tumor; and (2) the claim was not filed within one
hundred days after the mother learned of the alleged medical negligence.
The Court of Appeal affirmed after reluctantly conceding that it was
impressed with the logic and reasoning of two Michigan Supreme Court
cases which held unconstitutional a similar statute. The court also ac-
knowledged that the Equal Protection analysis of Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.
3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973), was persuasive. The Court
of Appeals essentially declined to rule upon the issue out of judicial defer-
ence to the Supreme Court. Now the issue has been layed at the Supreme
Court's doorstep.
16. Antieau, 1 Modern Constitutional Law 691 (1969). Judicial Mod-
esty: Down with the Old-Up with the New?, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 533
(1963).
17. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1959).
18. See, Friedman, The Court and Social Policy, 47 CALIF. ST. B.J.
558 (1972); Mosesian v. County of Fresno, 28 Cal. App. 3d 493, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (1973).
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Not only is it historically and conceptually appropriate for the
judiciary to challenge legislative enactments, but it is constitu-
tionally required of state and federal judges. 19 In Marbury v.
Madison'2 0 it was made clear that the constitutional mandate to
the judiciary, to rule on the constitutionality of legislation, was not
to be subordinated to questionable legislative enactments. 21 His-
torically, the courts as constitutional arbitors were not intended to
be responsive to the transient passions of the electorate or its rep-
resentatives.22
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY
To determine whether a statute is constitutionally infirm as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 23 and Article One of the
California Constitution, 24 one may subject it to four types of anal-
ysis depending upon the nature of the interest to be affected and
the basis of the classification: [1] reasonable or rational relation-
ship standard; [2] suspect classification; [3] as affecting a funda-
mental interest; and [4] as invidiously discriminatory in its appli-
cation. A brief analysis of each is essential to our discussion. 25
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution . . .shall be the su-
preme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."
20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. See Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Ander-
son, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1262 (1972).
22. See, Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50, Cal.
Rptr. 881, aff'd sub nom. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: ". . . No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
24. CALIF. CONST. Art. I, §§ 11, 21:
"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."
"No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may
not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislature; nor shall any citizen,
or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens."
25. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted
that the claim statute is also susceptible to Procedural Due Process analy-
sis.
The importance of a system of rules to an organized society was con-
ceded by Justice Harlan writing for the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971):
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
The California Supreme Court has construed the State Equal
Protection Clause as "substantially the equivalent" of the Equal
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system
of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, en-
abling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their
differences in an orderly, predictable manner.
In spite of its narrow holding that it violates Procedural Due Process to
impede access to the courts by requiring the poor to pay a filing fee to
obtain a divorce, Boddie is unique in that it deals with the rights of plain-
tiffs in a civil suit. Prior to Boddie, access litigation had traditionally in-
volved the rights of defendants.
Access to the judicial process requires that the potential litigant be able
to comply with the mechanics of litigation and succeed in convincing the
court that it should determine the claim on the merits. In light of Boddie,
it would not be unreasonable for the courts to conclude that substantial
justice and fair play require that justiciable matters be resolved on their
merits in the courts. As Justice Black noted in his dissent in Meltzer v.
C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), a decision which involved a
group of cases denying access to the Civil Courts:
Society generally encourages people to seek recompense when they
suffer damages through the fault of others. And I cannot believe
that my Brethren would find the rights of a man with both legs
cut off by a negligent railroad less "fundamental" than a person's
right to seek a divorce. (958) (Emphasis in original).
In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1972), the Supreme Court was
given an opportunity to confront the issue of access to the courts directly.
In Kras, the District Court had held the Bankruptcy filing fee provision as
an unconstitutional denial of the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process
of Law and as violative of Equal Protection. Justice Blackman, writing
for the Court, narrowly construed the implications of Boddie v. Connec-
ticut and concluded that the right to a discharge in bankruptcy is not a
"fundamental" right demanding a compelling governmental interest as a
precondition to regulation. Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined
in the opinion with Chief Justice Burger concurring. Justices Douglas
and Brennan joined in a dissenting opinion, and Justices Stewart and
Marshall each wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, directly confronted the is-
sue of access to the courts:
I view the case (Kras) as involving the right to access to the
courts, the opportunity to be heard when one claims a legal right,
and not just the right to discharge in bankruptcy. When a person
raises a claim of right or entitlement under the law, the only
forum in our legal system empowered to determine that claim
is a court.
The legal system is of course not so pervasive as to preclude
private resolution of disputes. But private settlements do not
determine the validity of claims of right. Such questions can be
authoritatively resolved only in courts. It is in that sense, I be-
lieve, that we should consider the emphasis in Boddie on the ex-
clusiveness of the judicial forum-and give Kras his day in court.
409 U.S. 434 at 462-463.
In consideration of the analysis in Kras and the five-four division of
the Court, it would not be overly optimistic to observe that the issue of
access to the court as a fundamental interest is yet unresolved. For a
general discussion see: Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L.
REv. 247 (1972).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus obviating
the necessity of separate analysis.2 6
[A] RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP CLASSIFICATION
The principle of equal protection does not preclude the state from
drawing distinctions between different groups of individuals 27
although it does insist that persons similarly situated with re-
spect to the particular enactment receive the same treatment. 28
To be valid under the Equal Protection Clause, a statutory discrim-
ination or classification must, at a minimum, bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 29
If a classification is unreasonable or without reasonable relations
to a proper legislative objective, the presumption of validity and
discretion is overcome. Under such circumstances, the Legisla-
ture has departed from the province of its discretion and the stat-
ute which proposes to afford one of two classes different treatment
must meet two requirements: some rational basis for singling out
the class and nondiscriminatory application within the class. 30
In reviewing a statute's constitutionality, the court is not con-
fined to the express language of the statute and may look to other
judicial, legislative, or administrative directions governing the
rights of other persons similarly situated.3 1
The rational relationship analysis imposes a heavy burden upon
one challenging an enactment such as the government claim stat-
26. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
27. Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305, 308-309 (1966). Brown v. Merlo,
8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); In re King, 3 Cal.
3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970).
28. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d
645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
29. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Gulf, Colo. & S. Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
30. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d
855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Hayes v. Superior Court, 6
Cal. 3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137, 98 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1971).
31. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932); Brown v. Merlo,
8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); see, e.g., James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Hayes v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 490
P.2d 1137, 98 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1971).
ute. The challenging party must neutralize every rational j usti-
fication for the statute because any reasonable relationship to a
legitimate state purpose is sufficient to repel a constitutional chal-
lenge.
[B] FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS
Fundamental interests are personal rights which are recognized
and protected by the Equal Protection Clause without explicit men-
tion in either the California or United States Constitution. To
date, the following personal rights have been recognized as funda-
mental interests: the right to procreate,32 the right to travel,33
the right to vote,3 4 and the right to education.3 5 The question of
how an interest is recognized as fundamental and singled out for
protection remains a judicial postulate upon which even members
of the United States Supreme Court have been unable to agree.3 6
When state statutory classifications approach sensitive and funda-
mental personal rights, the courts exercise a "stricter scrutiny".37
Any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of a funda-
mental interest is unconstitutional as violative of Equal Protec-
tion unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.38
32. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
33. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971); Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. 419 (1970).
35. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971). Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
36. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, suggested that fundamental interests are rights
which are inextricably intertwined with the purposes for which our Fed-
eral Government was formed. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642
(1966) (concurring opinion), he further suggested that fundamental inter-
ests need only be "recognized" by the Court to be afforded Equal Protec-
tion safeguards:
The Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitu-
tional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the
Constitution itself demands.
Justice Harlan took somewhat of a divergent view:
When a statute affects only matters not mentioned in the Federal
Constitution and is not arbitrary or irrational, I must reiterate
that I know of nothing which entitles, this Court to pick out
particular human activities, characterize them as "fundamental"
and give them added protection under an unreasonably stringent
equal protection test.
394 U.S. at 662 (dissenting opinion).
37. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 (1964); In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d
296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); See, Comment, Developments in
the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
38. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
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The application of a strict Equal Protection analysis to the clas-
sification imposed by the government claim statute will depend
upon whether access to the courts may be viewed as a fundamental
interest.8 9  Certainly, access to the courts is as important to the
establishment and maintenance of our system of government as
the right to vote, travel, and receive an education. To date, only
a few Federal District courts have been so bold as to refer to access
to the courts as a fundamental interest,40 and those decisions were
essentially overruled by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Kras.41
In Brown v. Merlo,42 the California Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff's attempt to challenge the automobile "guest statute" as
violative of plaintiff's fundamental right to sue for negligently in-
flicted injuries. The opinion did not discuss the substance of plain-
tiff's arguments; it merely made the observation that the plaintiff
cited "neither authority nor persuasive reasoning" for the proposi-
tion.43 In light of this recent pronouncement of the California
Supreme Court and the many divergent views held by the United
States Supreme Court, it is doubtful that access to the courts will
be accorded fundamental interest status in the near future.
[C] SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
In its most fundamental sense, the Equal Protection Clause is a
limitation on arbitrary legislative classifications and an insistence
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
39. See generally, Abram, Access to the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REv.
247 (1972).
40. In In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150, 1151 (D. Ore. 1971), an equal
protection approach was used to strike down a $50.00 bankruptcy filing
fee:
[A]ccess to court is a fundamental interest of citizenship, and the
Government's purely economic justification for bankruptcy filing
fees is not a sufficiently compelling interest to make such fees a
precondition of access to the courts.
O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); In re Smith,
323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971); In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), reversed United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1972); see discussion
at note 25, supra.
41. 409 U.S. 434 (1972); see discussion at note 25, supra.
42. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
43. Id., at 862, n.2; 506 P.2d at 216, n.2; 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392, n.2.
that capricious means not be utilized to attain even legitimate
ends. Certain statutory classifications including race,44 national
ancestry or lineage, 45 alienage,46 sex,47 and possibly wealth 48
have been found to be "constitutionally suspect" by the court and,
therefore, subject to the "most rigid scrutiny." Constitutionally
suspect classifications have been described as groups which are in
special need of protection because they are "discrete and insular"
minorities. 49 When minority groups in the community are subject
to legislative classification, the legislative judgment is more criti-
cally regarded because such groups generally cannot exert suffi-
cient political influence to protect their interests.50 Furthermore,
an overview of suspect classifications suggests that they share the
odious characteristics of being a stigma of inferiority or a badge of
opprobrium and not being readily subject to change.
A state which adopts a suspect classification bears a heavy bur-
den of justification.5 In order to justify the use of a suspect clas-
sification, a state must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial. 52
The courts utilize the "strict scrutiny" standard only in cases in-
volving "suspect classifications", which are comparable to racial
or sexual classifications. Thus, it must be concluded that the
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
45. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
46. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Raffaelli v. Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 8916
(1972).
47. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Cf. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
48. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. '12 (1956).
49. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.4 (1938).
50. Id.
51. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
52. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
The term "substantial" with reference to the governmental interest was
used in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1971); other terminology
has also been used by the Court to describe the governmental interest or
purpose: McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) ["overriding"];
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ["compelling"]; Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) ["important"]. The Court in In Re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973), did not find these variations particularly
significant as each referred to the same type of governmental interest.
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"strict scrutiny" standard would not be used for the Equal Protec-
tion analysis of the California Government Tort Claims Statute.
[D] DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION
Even though a state statute is fair on its face, invidiously dis-
criminatory action pursuant to its authority by public officials will
be violative of Equal Protection. 3 The common example used to
illustrate invidiously discriminatory application is that of San Fran-
cisco officials who would not permit Chinese to use their property
for laundries, while permitting others similarly situated to make
such use of their property; the Supreme Court of the United States
voided the ordinance. 54
Although, as this article will indicate, the claim statute is applied
unevenly and is used as a procedural barrier, there is no indication
that there is a policy of systematic discrimination practiced by all
governmental agencies, unless one may so term the prefunctory
denial of all claims. It is highly unlikely that this Equal Protec-
tion test would be applied in a challenge to the California claim
statute.
BROWN V. MERLO AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The preceding analyses as to which Equal Protection test might
be effectively applied to the California claim statute leads one to
the conclusion that the most probable approach is that of the tradi-
tional rational relationship analysis. In order to obtain a preview
of the form that such an analysis may take in its application to the
government claim statute, it is useful to examine the recent Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case of Brown v. Merlo55 where the court
53. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 17, reh. denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956); Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S.
347, 359 (1915).
54. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886):
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appli-
ance yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as to practically make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
55. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). An action
was brought for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while riding as a non-
paying guest in a vehicle driven by the defendant. Relying on the auto-
mobile "guest statute", the jury precluded plaintiff's recovery by failing to
addressed itself to the constitutionality of the automobile "guest
statute."56 The opinion is useful in this consideration of the claim
statute as it is a model of judicial analysis and application of the
"rational relationship" Equal Protection test.
The claim statute is suspectible to essentially the same analysis
applied to the automobile "guest statute." In fact, the parallels
between the two statutes-obsolescent historic justification, in-
iquitous application, and changing contemporary conditions-por-
tend the demise of the claim statute under similar analysis.
The traditional justifications of the "guest statute" were: first,
the protection of hospitality and, second, the elimination of collu-
sive suits. To achieve these goals, the statute made three "classifi-
cations" or "discriminations": [1] the statute distinguished be-
tween paying and non-paying passengers; [2] it distinguished be-
tween automobile guests and other types of guests,; and [3] it
created, through exceptions, statutory subclasses among "guests. '5 7
After an exhaustive analysis, the court concluded that the two
traditional justifications did not provide a reasonable explanation
for the tripartite "classification" or "discrimination". Thus, there
was no rational basis upon which the statute could be upheld against
constitutional attack.
From the opinion, one may distill a number of propositions which
apparently played a central role in the court's decision; these prop-
ositions established criteria which militated against the constitu-
tionality of the "guest statute":
[1] Any benefits rendered by the classifications did not justify
diminishing the rights of persons coming within the classifi-
cation;58
[2] The historic rationale was rendered inappropriate and in-
applicable under contemporary standards;59
find "intoxication" or "willful misconduct" on the part of the defendant.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's cause for negli-
gence was granted. An appeal was taken from the summary judgment
only; the Supreme Court reversed with directions to permit plaintiff to
proceed on his negligence cause.
56. Cal. Veh. Code § 17158:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and
driven by another person with his permission and no person who
as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without
giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has any
right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle
or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner
or guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action
establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the
intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
57. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d at 859.
58. Id., at 865, 873-875.
59. Id., at 869.
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[3] The classification was over inclusive and restricted the rights
of persons not intended to be covered by the classification; 60
[4] The exceptions to the classification were illogical and had no
relationship to the purpose to be achieved by the statute.61
When the above criteria are applied to the contemporary opera-
tion of the claim statute, it becomes apparent that it too is vio-
lative of Equal Protection. The discussion following infra will
illustrate the Brown v. Merlo Equal Protection analysis as it may
apply to the government claim statute.
THE CLAIM STATUTE AND EQUAL PROTECTION
[A] CALIFORNIA CASES REVIEWING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE CLAIM STATUTE
The California Supreme Court has on occasion examined the
constitutionality of the claim statute.6 2 Although the issue of con-
stitutionality has been raised, it has not received the careful anal-
ysis that such an important issue merits. The most recent Su-
preme Court case on the subject, Tammen v. County of San Diego,63
devotes little more than ten lines to the subject. Plaintiffs, the
widow and minor child of the decedent, brought an action for
wrongful death when decedent's automobile struck two horses that
had strayed onto a State highway. Plaintiffs failed to file a claim
within one hundred days of decedent's death; the court then denied
plaintiffs' application for permission to file a late claim. The Su-
preme Court affirmed as to the widow and reversed as to the minor.
The court in Tammen summarily held that the statute did not vio-
late the constitutional guarantees of Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection by concluding that "public agencies, generally speaking, af-
ford a proper subject for legislative classification. ' 64
The Tammen opinion relies principally upon Dias v. Eden Town-
60. Id., at 859, 876.
61. Id., at 878 et seq.
62. Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753,
58 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1967); Dias v. Eden Township Hospital Dist., 57 Cal.
2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962). Appellate courts have also
upheld the constitutionality of the claim statute with summary opinions.
Lewis v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. App. 3d 339, 98 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1971);
Wadley v. County of Los Angeles, 205 Cal. App. 2d 668, 23 Cal. Rptr. 154
(1962).
63. 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1967).
64. 66 Cal. 2d at 481, 426 P.2d at 761, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
ship Hospital District.5 In Dias, plaintiffs brought an action for
wrongful death but failed to allege in their complaint that a claim
had been filed. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the com-
plaint; the California Supreme Court affirmed with the same ob-
servation made in Tammen above.
The gist of the situation is that there has not been a thorough
analysis of the claim procedure comparable to the judicial analysis
contained in Muskopf v. Corning District Hospital6" or the Equal
Protection analysis in the recent case of Brown v. Merlo6 7
There is little merit to any suggestion that the constitutionality
of the claim statute has been considered and resolved in California.
The courts have yet to provide a satisfactory constitutional analysis
of whether the statute's classification of injured persons, according
to the identity of the tortfeasor, bears a reasonable relationship to
the purposes sought to be achieved.
The constitutionality of the California claim statute has not been
adjudicated, but rather it has been assumed pro forma.
[B] THE CLAIM STATUTE IS IRRATIONAL IN PRACTICE
Following the 1961 California Supreme Court decision in Mus-
kopf v. Corning District Hospital8 striking down sovereign im-
munity, a moratorium was declared to enable the California Law
Revision Commission to recommend and the Legislature to enact
a comprehensive law to regulate government tort liability. The
Tort Claims Act of 1963 retained the necessity of filing a claim 69
because, as noted previously, it was believed that it would: [1] per-
mit meritorious claims to be accepted without litigation; [2] permit
entities to make early investigation and defend against claims or
correct the offending condition or practice; and [3] facilitate the
65. 57 Cal. 2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962).
66. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). In Muskopf,
an action was brought for damages for injuries sustained by a paying pa-
tient operated upon by the defendant hospital district. After a reevalua-
tion of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability, the Court
concluded that it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust. In its opin-
ion, the Court meticulously reviewed the history of governmental immunity
and tested the reasons for its continuance against the results of its appli-
cation.
67. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
68. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); companion
case, Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359
P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
69. Prior to the Tort Claims Act of 1963, procedures governing claims
against the State were governed by former Government Code Sections
600-655, and claims against local public entities were governed by former
Government Code Sections 700-730.
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budgeting of potential liabilities and making it possible to obtain
realistically priced insurance. 70 In the ten years since the statute's
enactment, the validity of these rationale has erroded so that they
are now devoid of all substance.
The claim procedure fails to serve any of its intended purposes;
instead, the statute has served as a "trap for the unwary and ig-
norant claimant." The fear of the California Supreme Court that
the "labyrinth of claims statutes," existing prior to Muskopf, might
be rebuilt has materialized. 71
In order to assert one's right to damages for personal injuries
or wrongful death, a claim must be filed with the tortfeasor gov-
ernmental entity within one hundred days of the accrual of the
cause of action,72 even if the injured party is a minor.73  If for
some reason the one hundredth day is missed, only through a series
of artfully pleaded petitions and affidavits may the right to main-
tain an action be rescued from destruction. The complaining party
must first seek permission from the tortfeasor governmental en-
tity to file a claim not timely presented. 74 After its certain per-
70. 1 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 809 (1963); 4 Cal. Law Revision
Com. Rep. 1008 (1963). These justifications have also been echoed by the
courts without regard to the fact that in reality the statute has become a
procedural barrier which obstructs rather than furthers these enunciated
goals. See, Viles v. California, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 423 P.2d 818, 56 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1967); Bozaich v. California, 32 Cal. App. 3d 688, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1973); C.A. Magistretti Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 270,
103 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1972); Meyers v. Orange County, 6 Cal. App. 3d 626,
86 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1970).
71. Viles v. California, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 31, 423 P.2d 818, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1967), citing with approval Hobbs v. Northeast Sacramento County Sani-
tation Dist., 240 Cal. App. 2d 552, 49 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1966).
72. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2 (Deering 1973).
A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to
person or to personal property or growing crops shall be pre-
sented . . . not later than the 100th day after the accrual of the
cause of action...
The date of accrual of a cause of action is not affected by the claims re-
quirement, only the time when the right to proceed is terminated. Cal.
Gov. Code § 901 (Deering 1973); Los Angeles City School Dist. v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 459, 88 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1970); Frost v. California,
247 Cal. App. 2d 378, 55 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1966).
73. Wozniak v. Peninsula Hospital, 1 Cal. App. 3d 716, 82 Cal. Rptr.
84 (1969). A minor is entitled to mandatory relief from Government
Code Section 911.2, if petition for such relief is made to the court within
one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.6
(Deering 1973).
74. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4 (Deering 1973). Leave to present a claim
functory denial, the claimant must give notice and petition the Su-
perior Court for relief from the claim statute.75
What is set forth above as the claim procedure is but a skeleton
upon which is draped a plethora of distinctions and exceptions,
all professing to relieve the claimant of some particularly onerous
burden. One need only examine the recent case of Jamison v.
State of California76 to perceive the numerous legal machinations
that are often necessary to escape an unreasonably harsh result
imposed by the statute.77
1. Settlement of Meritorious Claims.
As previously noted, one of the justifications for the claim re-
quirement was that meritorious claims would not be resisted. A
mockery has been made of this premise by the artifice and deceit
practiced by some governmental entities; such conduct has forced
persons with legitimate causes of action to seek vindication in court
of their right to even present a claim. Among the activities which
the courts have condemned are the following: intentionally failing
not timely filed must be sought within one year after the accrual of the
cause of action. The governmental entity shall either grant or deny the
petition within forty-five days, on the grounds set forth in Government
Code § 911.6.
75. Cal. Gov. Code § 946.6 (Deering 1973). Our experience has been
that not only are all timely claims denied, but those where permission
is sought to file a late claim are also denied as a matter of course.
In cases where the injured party has failed to seek the assistance of
counsel until after the one hundredth day, a formidable array of documents
is prepared in an attempt to preserve or rescue the right of action. The
following are submitted to the governmental entity: petition to file a
claim not timely presented; affidavit of the prospective claimant; affidavit
of claimant's attorney; and a proposed claim. After the petition's pre-
functory denial, the following documents are prepared to be filed with
the Superior Court: notice of petition to the court; petition to the court;
declaration of claimant's attorney; points and authorities; and all docu-
ments filed with the governmental entity are incorporated and made a
part of the petition by appending them as exhibits.
The points and authorities are prepared in an attempt to demonstrate
to the court that the claimant can be compartmentalized into one of the
exceptions to the statute which will entitle him to relief: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) minority during the whole
claims period; (3) physical or mental incapacity during the claimed pe-
riod; and, (4) that the claimant died before the expiration of the claims
period.
76. Jamison v. California, 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1973).
77. This presupposes that a court will address itself to the merits and
justice of a case and not cloak itself in the self-righteous mantle of "judi-
cial restraint" and "separation of powers" to justify a bad result. See,
Mosesian v. County of Fresno, 28 Cal. App. 3d 493, 104 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1973).
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tQ advise a claimant that he has filed with the wrong agency;78
advising the claimant that a private agency was responsible for the
injury and refusing to provide a requested claim form;79 mislead-
ing a claimant to believe that his claim was rejected instead of the
petition to file a late claim; 0 and conducting negotiations until the
period to file suit had run and then asserting failure to file a
claim as a defense. 8'
The California Law Revision Commission itself has realized the
vacuity of its original premises-that meritorious claims would be
settled-since " . . . many public entities take no action on claims
as a matter of policy. '8 2 The origin of this "policy" is uncertain
although there is some indication that it is the result of pressure
applied by insurance carriers.8 3
78. Jamison v. California, 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1973).
79. Fredricksen v. City of Lakewood, 6 Cal. 3d 353, 491 P.2d 805,
99 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1971); Rand v. Andreatta, 60 Cal. 2d 846, 389 P.2d 382,
36 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1964).
80. McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 35, 105 Cal. Rptr. 384
(1972).
81. Potstada v. City of Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 106 Cal. Rptr.
705 (1973).
82. 9 Cal. Law Rev. Com. Rep. 55 (1969). The commission then rec-
ommended that Government Code Section 945.6 be amended to extend the
time for filing suit from one year to two years when the claim was denied
by inaction. In 1970, the amendment was enacted. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch.
104, § 6, operative January 1, 1971, ch. 346, § 1.
83. Cal. Law Rev. Com., First Supplement to Memorandum 73-25,
Study 52-Sovereign Immunity (Claims Statute), March 24, 1973.
California Government Code Section 990.4 permits any local public en-
tity which is not a state agency to obtain liability insurance or self-insure
against negligence.
The following excerpt is illustrative of the influence exerted by insurance
carriers: Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda,
State of California, Resolution No. 140440, September 28, 1971.
WHEREAS, this Board of Supervisors is in receipt of a claim
against the County of Alameda filed on August 18, 1971, by J. M.,
attorney on behalf of A. B. H., for the amount of $1,000,000.00 al-
leging that, while said claimant was in the custody of the Alameda
County Sheriff he was assaulted by two (2) inmates, resulting in
the loss of sight of his left eye; and
WHEREAS, the County's insurance carrier, Chubb/Pacific In-
demnity Group, recommends that said claim be denied; and
WHEREAS, this board of Supervisors did consider said claim of
A. B. H.;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that this Board of Su-
pervisors does hereby deny the claim of A. B. H. against the
County of Alameda filed by J. M., Attorney at Law, on August 18,
1971, for the total amount of $1,000,000.00. (Emphasis added).
It is dismaying that injured persons should receive such treatment
at the hands of institutions whose very existence is intended to
serve the citizenry. Government owes to the citizen the duty of pro-
viding "protection, security and benefit" 84 and, as such, should
treat the citizen with a higher degree of fairness than he may ex-
pect from private persons or entities. In the same spirit, the con-
cept of due process of law represents " . . . a profound attitude of
fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the
individual and government."8 5
In consideration of the above, it is difficult to perceive the man-
ner in which the claim statute promotes settlement of meritorious
claims.
2. Early Investigation and Correction of Offending Conditions.
A second justification of the claim statute is that it permits early
investigation, preparation of a defense, and the correction of offend-
ing conditions or practices.
The implication which is drawn from the need for early investi-
gation is that it is necessary because governmental entities are some-
how disadvantaged in this respect. To the contrary, in most cases,
the claimant must depend upon information within the exclusive
possession of the prospective defendant or another governmental
entity. In medical negligence actions, all parties must rely heavily
upon medical charts, x-rays, and laboratory reports, all of which
are either in the possession of the prospective defendant or a neu-
A substantial part of the problem lies in the failure of attorneys to make
demands for damages which are commensurate with the gravity of the
injury sustained by the claimant. If a demand for damages is exorbitant,
summary denial of a claim is to be expected.
A public entity must consider a number of factors in determining
whether a demand for damages is appropriate: whether the case is de-
fensible, the gravity of the injury, the reputation of the law firm or attor-
ney representing the claimant, venue of the case so far as it relates to the
size of jury verdicts in the past, and the size of jury verdicts in general for
similar injuries. In simplified terms, the ingredients of settlement may
be summarized as the "risk-reward" factor: (1) a public entity will settle
a matter when it determines that there is an unacceptable risk that a jury
verdict may exceed the claimant's demand; and (2) the plaintiff will settle
when there is an unacceptable probability that a jury may award an
amount which is substantially less than the amount offered in settlement, or
perhaps nothing at all.
84. CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 2:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is in-
stituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people, and
they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever public
good may require it.
85. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951) (concurring opinion).
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tral party. 6 In an action for maintenance of a dangerous condi-
tion on public property, the claimant must rely upon plans, records,
and statistics which are in the exclusive control of the entity.87
And, in the case of automobile collisions, all parties must look to
the accident report prepared by the police to guide their investiga-
tion.8 8
The filing of a claim is not essential to the correction of an of-
fending condition. The authors submit that mere verbal or written
notice should be sufficient to motivate a governmental entity to
act, and the purposefully ambiguous pleading in a written claim is
of little assistance in this respect.8 9
86. In medical negligence actions, it is the claimant who is disadvan-
taged in the preparation of his case. In such actions, the crucial question
is whether the physician or hospital adhered to standard medical practice
in the diagnosis, care and treatment of the claimant. Only by examining
the medical records, created and maintained by the prospective defendant,
can one even determine the nature and course of the medical care rendered.
Medical records are in most cases the very basis of liability. The claimant
may also be examined by an independent medical specialist in order to
reconstruct the course of his medical treatment. In wrongful death cases,
the problem of evaluating the course of medical care is more difficult since
the only documentation other than the medical records is the autopsy or
coroner's report.
87. As in medical negligence cases, the claimant in a highway design
defect case must rely totally upon information which is within the ex-
clusive control of state agencies. To evaluate the potential liability in such
a case, one must obtain construction contracts, blue prints, proposed plans
and drawings, approved and as completed plans and drawings. These
documents may consist of hundreds of pages all of which must be exam-
ined by a qualified expert.
88. A police report not only describes the facts and circumstances of
an accident, but it also renders a preliminary evaluation of fault. Thus, if
a governmental agency is the owner of an automobile involved in an auto-
mobile collision, it is immediately placed on notice that liability may
arise from it.
89. Government Code Section 910 (Deering 1973) sets forth the informa-
tion which must appear in a claim. Section 910, subdivision (e), requires
that a description of the circumstances of the occurrence be given; the cir-
cumstances are generally set forth in broad pleading terminology such as
the following:
In Niles v. City of San Rafael, Civil No. 624, 337 (S.F. County, Cal.,
filed Nov. 12, 1970), an action was brought against a school district for
negligent supervision:
Daie, Place and Other Circumstances Which Give Rise To This
Claim:
1. The occurrence happened on or about June 26, 1970, at Bahia
Vista School, a San Rafael City School District, at 125 Bahia Way,
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3. Insurance.
The third justification for the claim statute is that it permits the
budgeting of potential liabilities and makes it possible to obtain
reasonably priced liability insurance.
Every claim filed with a governmental entity is required to indi-
cate a dollar figure for the alleged damages sustained. 90 This fig-
ure seldom bears any relationship to the potential liability which
may arise when the matter is resolved. This is true for two rea-
sons: (1) one hundred days is too short a period in which to eval-
uate even a moderate injury; and (2) the amount sought in claims
as damages is not binding upon the claimant if the claim is denied.9
in the Cit of San Rafael, County of Marin, State of California.
2. At said time and place above mentioned, the San Rafael City
School District, acting by and through its agents servants and
employees, conducted and/or permitted to be conducted on said
premises, a recreation program or similar activity. KELLY
NILES, a minor of the age of eleven (11) years, was in attendance
at said event at said time and place. As a direct and proximate
result of the negligence and carelessness of the San Rafael City
School District, and its agents, servants and employees, in the own-
ership, control and entrustment of said premises, and in the
selection, planning, operation, control, staffing, supervision, and
conduct of said program, the minor claimant KELLY NILES was
caused to be precipitated to the ground and struck about the head
and other parts of his body for a substantial period of time.
In Chimienti v. Markoff, Civil No. 74956 (Tulare County, Cal., filed
April 9, 1973), an action was brought against a district hospital for wrong-
ful death:
D. DATE AND PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: For some time prior
to April 1, 1972, and thereafter until the decedent's death on or
about April 19, 1972, the decedent, VITO JOE CHIMIENTI, was
from time to time a patient at the KAWEAH DELTA DISTRICT
HOSPITAL, Visalia, California.
E. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF OCCURRENCE: That at all
times and places mentioned above the decedent consulted the
KAWEAH DELTA DISTRICT HOSPITAL for the purpose of ob-
taining diagnosis and treatment of an illness or medical condi-
tion, and employed said hospital to diagnose his sickness and
treat and care for him for compensation, which said decedent
agreed to pay. Thereon, said decedent became a patient of said
hospital and remained under its care at all times and places men-
tioned above. Said hospital undertook said employment and un-
dertook and agreed to diagnose decedent's illness and to care for
and treat decedent and do all things necessary and proper in
connection therewith, and said hospital thereafter entered on such
employment, individually and by and through its employees and
agents.
The KAWEAH DELTA DISTRICT HOSPITAL in connection with
others, was negligent and careless in and about said care, treat-
ment, diagnosis and control of decedent.
90. Cal. Gov. Code § 910, subd. (f) (Deering 1973).
91. Orth v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 474, 53 Cal. Rptr. 156(1966); Steed v. City of Long Beach, 153 Cal. App. 2d 488, 315 P.2d 101
(1957); Sullivan v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 Cal. App. 2d 745,
214 P.2d 82 (1950). See, A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT
LIABILITY, § 8.20 (1964, Supp. 1969).
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Even a moderate injury such as a cervical strain sustained in an
automobile collision may require more than one hundred days to
stabilize. In severe cases involving paraplegia or quadraplegia, it
will take more than one year for the claimant's medical problems
to stabilize, and, then, at least one year or more will be required
for rehabilitative care. In either case, the attorney who places his
demand within the settlement range before the claimant's medical
condition stabilizes does his client a grave disservice. 92
Furthermore, the damages figure sought in a governmental claim
does not limit the amount recoverable or the amount which may
be sought when a complaint is filed.9 3 This, in and of itself, demon-
strates the inadequacy of this justification under contemporary
standards.
Liability insurance premiums and the annual budgets of govern-
mental entities are not affected by the dollar value of the claims
submitted annually. Rather, the significant figure is the amount
which is actually paid by way of settlement or judgment annually.
This alone reflects the actual annual cash flow to satisfy liabilities
incurred as a result of negligent conduct.
Local public entities such as cities and counties function much
like any large business or corporation. City and County Manage-
ment is charged with the obligation of conducting the business of
government in a financially responsible manner; its primary obliga-
tion is to maintain fiscal solvency. This is a demanding task since
the entities' source of income is dependent upon local taxation and
92. If the governmental entity should accept the claim, the claimant is
then bound to accept the amount originally sought in full satisfaction.
Cal. Gov. Code § 912.6, subd. (4) (b) (Deering 1973).
93. Sullivan v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 Cal. App. 2d 745,
764-765, 214 P.2d 82 (1950):
It seems too clear to require extended argument that, in a proper
case, an injured person should not be limited arbitrarily to the
amount of his claim. Such claims must be filed within a very
short time after the accident. Many times, as in the instant case,
the claim must be filed while the person is still in the hospital
and before the extent of his injuries is known. If it were held
that the injured person is absolutely limited to the amount of his
claim filed before the injuries caused by the governmental agency
have been definitely ascertained, grave injustices would nec-
essarily result, as the instant case demonstrates. Moreover, it
would result in lawyers always filing excessive claims, out of an
abundance of caution, and thus tend to prevent the settlement of
such claims-one of the major reasons for the requirement of filing
the claim.
revenue grants from the State Legislature. Under such circum-
stances, sound business practice dictates that potential unliqui-
dated claims for money damages must somehow be transformed
into fixed, liquidated obligations. The most effective means of
liquidating potential claims for money damages arising out of per-
sonal injuries or wrongful death is the securing of insurance. By
obtaining insurance, a governmental entity is able to liquidate its
potential obligations into an annual premium.
The business of insuring a risk is not a haphazard affair. Based
upon prior experience, insurance underwriters are able to analyze
and insure a risk while making a profit as any business enterprise
seeks to do.
Although an insurance carrier may underwrite a risk and cause
the governmental entity to pay a premium, the claim statute pro-
vides the insurer with a wind-fall defense. It may even be suggested
in such circumstances that the insurer has received a premium with-
out actually having insured the risk.
[C] CLAIM STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
In the last two years, the Supreme Courts of two states have
undertaken to restore equilibrium between contemporary stand-
ards and the current rule of law governing the validity of claim
statutes. The Courts' analyses focused on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and comparable sections of their respective state consti-
tutions. The only analytical test, which has thus far been applied,
is the traditional Equal Protection "rationality" standard.
In Reich v. State Highway Department,94 the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the sixty day notice provision of the Michigan
Tort Claim Act,95 in effect, created a special statute of limitations
with respect to actions arising from governmental negligence and,
therefore, violated Equal Protection guarantees of the State and
Federal Constitution.
The plaintiff in Reich sustained an injury to the cervical spine
when the automobile she was driving swerved out of control and
94. 386 Mich. 698, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). There were also two com-
panion cases which were consolidated for purposes of resolving the con-
stitutionality of the claim statute: Knapp v. State Hwy. Dep't, Baker v.
State Hwy. Dep't.
95. Mich. Stats. Ann. § 3.996 (104). It should be noted that before this
case was heard by the Supreme Court the sixty day period was extended to
one hundred and twenty days. This was not considered a significant
distinction.
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collided with a tree. The claim for personal injuries against the
State Highway Department was filed sixty-three days after the
accident and three days after the statutory period had run.96
The Court observed that the objective of legislation abolishing
governmental immunity for negligence was to put governmental
tortfeasors on an "equal footing" with private tortfeasors.9 7 The
Court in Reich concluded that the claim requirement arbitrarily
split each of two natural classes, tortfeasors and victims, into two
differently treated subclasses. Regarding tortfeasors:
[T]he notice provisions of the statute arbitrarily split the natural
class, i.e., all tort-feasors, into two differently treated subclasses:
private tort-feasors to whom no) notice of claim is owed and
governmental tort-feasors to whom notice is owed.98
With respect to tortfeasors, the Court concluded that this consti-
tuted "an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in the treatment of
both portions of one natural class and is, therefore, barred by the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection."99
With respect to victims of negligence, the Court observed that:
Just as the notice requirement by its operation divides the natural
class of negligent tort-feasors, so too the natural class of victims of
negligent conduct is also arbitrarily split into two subclasses:
victims of governmental negligence who must meet the require-
ment, and victims of private negligence who are subject to no
such requirement. 100
The Court construed this discrimination against victims as a spe-
cial statute of limitations which arbitrarily barred a victim's cause
of action after only sixty days, while victims of private negligence
were afforded three years. 1 1
The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the statute's arbi-
trary distinction in the treatment of members of the same class was
violative of the Equal Protection guarantees of the Michigan and
United States Constitution.
96. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702. In Knapp v. State Hwy. Dep't.,
supra note 94, the claim was filed twenty-eight days after the sixty day
period. In Baker v. State Hwy. Dep't., the claim was filed four days after
the statutory period had passed.
97. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
98. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
99. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
100. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
101. 386 Mich. at 620, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
In Turner v. Staggs,10 2 the Nevada Supreme Court held the six
month statutory notice of claim requirement 0 8 violative of the
Equal Protection guarantees of the Nevada and United States Con-
stitution.1 0 4
In Turner, a wrongful death action was brought against a county
hospital for medical negligence. A claim was filed against the hos-
pital on behalf of the decedent's minor children thirteen months
after her death. The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that it
could confine itself to the immediate issue of whether the notice
of claim statute was violative of the rights of minors to Due Pro-
cess.' 0 ' Rather than approach the problem in such narrow fashion,
the Court chose to conclude that, within the present scheme of gov-
ernment, the "claim statutes serve no beneficial use . but they
are indeed a trap for the unwary." 08
In its opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted in toto the
rationale of the Michigan Supreme Court in Reich v. State High-
way Department.10 7
Although the analyses of these two opinions are not exhaustive,
they reflect a judicial disaffection with the constitutional vitality
of government claim statutes. They recognize that established rules
of law must be reviewed, and their validity judged by contempor-
ary standards rather than by antiquated pronouncements.
PENULTIMATE REFLECTIONS
The strongest justification of the claims statute is the proposi-
tion that every citizen ought to have a means of dealing with his
government without the necessity of filing a lawsuit. The means
selected to provide this avenue of redress must be such that they
do not curtail the right of a civil litigant to have his claim ad-
judicated on the merits. The claim statute would serve a salutory
purpose if, in fact, it did permit the resolution of controversies be-
tween citizen and government without the necessity of litigation;
but the collapse of the claim statute system has given rise to a
formidable procedural barrier to citizens seeking the resolution of
their controversies with the government.
In selecting an approach to the claim statute, the court may
choose from a number of constitutional analyses: rational rela-
.102. Civil No. 6770 (Nev. Sup. Ct., filed June 6, 1973).
103. N.R.S. §§ 244.245, 244.250.
104. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV, § 1; NEv. CoNsT., art. 8, § 5.
105. Turner v. Staggs, Civil No. 6770, at 5 (Nev. Sup. Ct., filed June 6,
1973).
106. Id., at 6.
107. Id., at 6 et seq.
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tionship analysis, fundamental interest analysis, and Procedural
Due Process analysis. The latter two analyses require the courts
to directly confront the issue of access to the courts and to deter-
mine whether it is so fundamental an interest that substantial fair-
ness and justice do not permit its infringement. The rational re-
lationship analysis requires no more than a cogently reasoned anal-
ysis of the legislative interest served by the statute and the result
of it implementation.
The historic rationale which justified enactment of the claim re-
quirement have ceased to be applicable. As noted previously,
meritorious claims are rejected as a matter of policy; governmen-
tal entities do not require a claim to adequately prepare a defense
or correct an offending condition; and the claim does not aid gov-
ernmental entities in determining their monetary liabilities. Since
the claim statute has ceased to render a practical advantage or to
serve its intended purpose, its classifications do not justify the de-
struction of a cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The California government claim statute appears to be clothed
with constitutional infirmity. To date, its constitutionality has not
been subjected to in-depth review, but rather it has been assumed
pro forma. In light of contemporary standards, the distinctions the
statute draws are of doubtful validity when subjected to Equal
Protection analysis.
It is now quite apparent that the rule of law governing claim
statutes must be brought into equilibrium with contemporary
standards. At this juncture, only the courts can deal swiftly,
firmly, and unequivocally to prevent further injustice to those who
are fortuitously injured by the negligence of governmental agen-
cies.
